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Duty of Fair Représentation 
Récent Attitudes in British Columbia 
and Ontario 
David C. McPhillips 
This paper discusses how far the duty of fair représentation 
should be broadened in Canada and then argues that the Labour 
Boards are not the appropriate body to hâve jurisdiction over 
such matter. 
"Unions hâve become so powerful that they don't even represent their 
membership." 
The above statement, which in one form or another is often expressed 
at seminars and courses in Labour Relations, essentially poses a political 
problem. If it were true, the union or unions in question would be removed 
democratically. However, anyone with even the slightest understanding of 
démocrates realizes that individual members and minorities within larger 
groups require protection. A trade union, once certified, is the exclusive 
bargaining agent for ail the employées in the unit. Depending on the circum-
stances of the représentation vote and the terms of the collective agreement, 
the union might represent not only strong supporters of the union but also 
passive supporters, those who actually voted against the union and refused 
to join and those who had to join sometime after the vote (due to closed or 
union shop provisions in the contract). Therefore, the trade union must ac-
cept the obligations of exclusive représentation, namely that ail members 
are fairly represented. The existence of this duty can be inferred from the 
fact that the bargaining agent is given the exclusive authority to bargain col-
lectively on behalf of ail employées in a bargaining unit. This inference per-
mitted the Labour Boards to exact from the unions a compliance with basic 
standards of fair représentation even before many of the présent statutory 
provisions were enacted. 
The historical évolution of this doctrine is very clearly set out in other 
paper s1 and will not be repeated hère. This paper will discuss how far the 
* McPHILLIPS, D.C., Barrister and Sollicitor, Faculty of Commerce and Business 
Administration, University of British Columbia. 
1 ZABOS, Gary A., "Fair Représentation, the Arbitrary, Discriminatory or Bad 
Faith", Test in Canada, (1978-1979) 43 Saskatchewan Law Review 19. 
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duty should be broadened in Canada and then argue that the Labour 
Boards are not the appropriate body to hâve jurisdiction over this area of 
labour relations. 
SCOPE OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 
The fédéral and provincial labour codes in Canada each contain a sec-
tion dealing with the duty of fair représentation. The statutes impose upon 
the trade union a duty to represent ail the members of the bargaining unit in 
a manner that is free of bad faith, discrimination and arbitrariness2. The 
Canada Code, as of 1978, requires that the bargaining agent "represent, 
fairly and without discrimination, ail employées in the bargaining unit"3. It 
has yet to be decided whether the fédéral language differs significantly 
enough to give rise to a différent type of obligation. The Labour Boards 
hâve used thèse sections to ensure that the unions use their power vis-à-vis 
the employer for the good of the membership at large, but the Boards hâve 
not used it to limit extensively the internai affairs of the union. It is only if a 
union's actions in its capacity as bargaining agent in some way jeopardizes 
that employee's employment relationship will the Board intervene4. 
In gênerai the internai affairs of the union hâve been viewed as a pri-
vate contractual matter between the trade union and the employée. The pro-
per formai forum for resolution of disputes related to constitutional pro-
blems such as élection of officers, membership, and discipline is either the 
courts or, if it is applicable, the Human Rights authorities5. Further, there 
are a number of other avenues open to dissatisfied member including: 
(i) removal of the exclusive by the constitutional processes; 
(ii) decertification of the existing union and withdrawal from collective 
bargaining; 
(iii) removal of the existing union and replacement with a more suitable 
one. 
2 E.g. Labour Code of British Columbia, 1973 S.B.C. c. 122 as amended Sec. 7; 
Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1970 RSO c. 232 as amended by 1975 S.O.C. 76, sec. 60; see 
also ADELL, B., "The Duty of Fair Représentation; Effective Protection for Individual 
Rights in Collective Agreements", (1970) Vol. 25, Relations Industrielles, p. 602. 
3 Canada Labour Code, 1966-67. C. 62 as amended, sec. 136.1 
4 Rayonier, 1975 2 Can. LRBR 497, B.C.C.R.B. Décision No. 40/75; Johnston and 
B.C. Hydro, B.C.L.R.B. Décision No. 7/75; 1975 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 362; ReginaldFulks and 
Teamsters, B.C.L.R.B. Letter Décision L83/79, July 23, 1979, Atchison and AUCE, 
B.C.L.R.B. Letter Décision L66/79, June 28, 1979; Joyce, Harvey, Halverson and Vancouver 
Municipal & Reg. Employées Union, B.C.L.R.B. Décision No. 79/79; George Lochner, 
1980 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 149 (Ont.). 
5 Johnston and B.C. Hydro, op. cit., at footnote (4) at 362. 
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However, it should be noted the fédéral Code appears to go further 
than the provincial statues in permitting intervention in internai affairs of 
the union6. 
"Sec. 185 No trade union and no person acting on behalf of a trade union shall: 
(f) expel or suspend an employée from membership in the trade union or deny mem-
bership in the trade union to an employée by applying to him in a discriminatory 
manner the membership rules of the trade union; 
(g) take disciplinary action against or impose any form of penalty on an employée 
by applying to him in a discriminatory manner the standards of discipline of the 
trade union; 
(h) expel or suspend an employée from membership in the trade union or take disci-
plinary action against or impose any form of penalty on an employée by reason 
of his having refused to perform an act that is contrary to this Part; or"7 
The effect of thèse sections was reviewed recently in the case of Terry 
Ma tus and the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union 
Local 5028. Chairman Marc Lapointe, after examining other jurisdictions, 
indicated that the reluctance to intervene in internai union affairs was un-
doubtedly a sensible approach, but the explicit language of Section 185 re-
quires the Canadian Board to protect rights that Parliament has explicitly 
conferred on the employées within the fédéral realm. In this case, one of 
suspension for dual unionism, the Board ordered reinstatement. The com-
plainant has been told he was "dead as a longshoreman" which of course in 
a hiring hall situation might be interpreted as a threat of more than simply 
internai discipline. Furthermore, to the extent that section 185 they will 
basically do so only when internai appeal procédures hâve been exhausted9. 
It should also be noted that most Canadian Labour Codes contain pro-
visions10 restricting any person, including the union from any coercive or in-
timidating action compelling or inducing any person from becoming or 
refraining from becoming or continuing to be a member of a union. There-
fore, should a union's conduct reach such proportions as to contravene 
thèse sections, the Boards will assume jurisdictions. 
6 Nowatnick and Ostby and Grain Workers Union Local 333, [l979J 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 
466 (Can.). 
7 Canada Labour Code, Sec. 185. 
8 Décision No. 211, March 6, 1980. 
9 Gerald Abbott, [l978] 1 Can. LRBR 305 (Ont.); George Lochner, op. cit., at foot-
note (4). 
10 B.C. Code Sec. 5; Ont. Code Sec. 161; Canada Code Sec. 186. 
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Finally, it is obvious that to be protected by the duty of fair représenta-
tion, an employée must be a member of a bargaining unit rather than of 
management11 and must be a member at the time of the alleged infraction12. 
APPLICATION OF THE DUTY 
The requirement of the absence of bad faith, discrimination and arbi-
trariness has been held to apply to a union in two areas; during negotiations 
and during the administration of a collective agreement. Let us look briefly 
at how thèse areas hâve traditionally been affected. 
Negotiations 
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT 
THE DEGREE OF LATITUDE ENJOYED BY THE UNION 
The issue before us at this point is the extent to which the union enjoys 
the freedom to negotiate terms which it feels are in the best interests of most 
of its members. It is a trite observation that any collective agreement cannot 
completely satisfy each and every member of a bargaining unit. As a resuit 
of this, the Boards hâve in fact given the unions substantial latitude in terms 
of the content of collective agreements and we suggest that the reasons can 
be divided into two catégories. 
The Majority Ru les: the first rationale finds its strength in the theory 
that what is best for the most will ultimately be to the benefit of everyone in 
a collectivity. This position was implicitly adopted by the B.C. Board in the 
Escon and B.C. Distillery14 cases in which the Board cited a United States 
Suprême Court Décision in Ford Motor Company v. Huffman to the effect 
that: 
"The complète satisfaction of ail who are represented is hardly to be expected. 
A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining représenta-
tive in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complète good faith and 
honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discrétion."15 
n S.C. Leeson andLabourers International Union ofNorth America, Security Officers 
and Miscellaneous Personnel Local 105, B.C.L.R.B. Letter Décision L64/79, June 28, 1979. 
12 International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, Local 2 and Bricklayers, 
Masons Independent Union of Canada, Local 1, Bricklayers Masons Independent Union of 
Canada, Local 1, Welfare Trust Fund and John Meiorin, \\919\ 2 Can. LRBR 233 (Ont.); 
James Mason & CUPE Local 87, [l979] 2 Can. LRBR 173 (Ont.); Joyce, Harvey, Halvorsen 
and Vancouver Municipal & Reg. Employées Union, op. cit., at footnote (4). 
13 Esco, B.C.L.R.B. Décision No. 55/77 at pp. 8-9. 
H B.C. Distillery, B.C.L.R.B. Décision No. 85/77 at p. 7. 
15 -23 LC 145 at pp. 148-149. 
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Practical Problems: Even if the Board had the inclination to tinker 
with collective agreements, there are very serious practical considérations 
associated with such an approach. If the union had to be concerned as to 
whether dissident employées *'could corne to the Board and readily attack 
the reasonableness and fairness of any contract 16™$" the entire process 
could break down16. The more appropriate recourse for the dissatisfied 
membership is to refuse to ratify the contract. 
SPECIFIC SITUATIONS WHERE THE BOARD WOULD INTERVENE 
However, there are always exceptions to a rule. At what point could a 
member successfully complain about the terms of an agreement? The basic 
test which the B.C. Board has laid down in this regard is: 
"What the Board is concerned about in measuring the conduct of union repré-
sentatives during the negotiating process is whether the employées affected hâve been 
treated honestly and in good faith. The adequacy of the settlement is not necessarily 
in issue. What is in issue is whether the trade union by its conduct has acted fairly in 
the interest of employées in dealing with the employer with respect to their terms and 
conditions of employment."17 
The restriction is thus based on whether the unions action can be char-
acterized as being unfair — not on whether the settlement is inadéquate in 
the eyes of the Board. 
The Negotiation of Oppressive Terms: The Ontario Board is respond-
ing to a complaint from students in the Mason case that the union had nego-
tiated a lower rate for them cited the cases of C. U.P.E.18 and Ford Motor 
Company19 and reterated its position that trade-offs are part of collective 
bargaining and may involve the abandonment of the interests of certain in-
dividual members. The test to be applied is whether " . . . the respondent has 
exerted equal effort on behalf of ail classifications in the bargaining unit."20 
If the union were to negotiate terms of contract which unduly favored some 
employées over others and there was no conceivable justification for that 
position, the Board would hâve to intervene. Examples which hâve been 
suggested would include clauses which contain lower pay rates for female 
jobs, separate seniority lists for certain groups due to race, colour or creed 
and higher wage rates for union members (over non-union members who 
are performing the same tasks)21. Of course, this is an extremely dangerous 
16 B.C. Distillery, op. cit., at footnote (14) at pp. 8-9. 
17 Esco, op. cit., at footnote (14) at p. 15, quoting Diamond Z. Association, 1975 
OLRB 796. 
18 [1976] O.L.R.B. Rep., (Sept.) 508. 
19 [1973] O.L.R.B. Rep., (Oct.) 519. 
20 Mason, op. cit., at footnote (12) at 180. 
21 B.C. Distillery, op. cit., at footnote (14). 
808 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 36. NO 4 (1981) 
proposition for it would open the door for Labour Boards to involve itself 
in the review of the terms of each collective agreement negotiatecl within its 
jurisdiction. 
Significant Altérations in the Contract: The B.C. Board in the B.C. 
Distillery case22, took the opportunity to discuss (in obiter as the case was 
decided on other technical grounds) a situation in which a union negotiated 
"superseniority" provisions for workers who had actively participated on 
the picket line throughout a lengthy strike. 
Under the agreement made with the employer, thèse employées were to 
be given first option at the positions available in the plant. The Board ex-
pressed a definite inclination to look behind the scènes in cases where, on 
the face of the matter, there appears to be potential irregularity. In doing 
so, it adopted the following position: 
"As Professor Archibald Cox has said: "When established seniority rights are 
changed, the bargaining représentative should be required to show some practical 
justification beyond the design of the majority to share the job opportunities there-
tofore enjoyed by a smaller group." (Cox, "The Duty of Fair Représentation", 
1957 , 2 Villanova L.R. 151 at p. 164)... 
Rather, I simply want to emphasize the point that the Notion of superseniority, 
involving as it does a stark déviation from the basic principle of seniority clauses for 
the benefit of a particular and preferred group of employées, does invite légal scru-
tiny from the Board. Such superseniority clauses do require justification on their 
merits before they can be legally sustained."23 
The Seulement of Outstanding Grievances: A common-place occur-
rence at the bargaining table is the establishment of procédures which are 
designed to expedite unresolved grievances. The Ontario Board has taken 
the position that this approach is quite acceptable and notes that parties 
often "hâve fashioned a procédure that ties grievance negotiations to the 
negotiation of a new collective agreement in order to provide an underlying 
urgency for compromise and rational discussion... and neither procédure is 
inherently unfair or arbitrary."24 
There is little Canadian jurisprudence on this subject but there has been 
some discussion of the matter in the United States. 
"The key considération from the standpoint of swapping, however, is the 
union's knowledge that the trade will disadvantage a particular individual. Courts 
can safely favor union swapping discrétion when no identified individuals or groups 
are involved. In trading one gênerai proposition for another — for example, ex-
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., at pp. 12-15. 
24 Nick Bachiu and U.S. W. Local 1005 and Steel Company of Canada, [1976] 1 Can . 
L.R.B.R. 439 (Ont.). 
25 Ibid., at p. 439. 
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posure to compulsory overtime in exchange for better vacation benefits — the union 
should hâve a free rein. If some employées later complain that the benefits and bur-
dens fell unequally, the inequality can be tolerated as an incidental effect of the bar-
gaining process."26 
Judging from other comments, it seems likely that the Boards in 
Canada will foliow this approach. The Ontario Board has noted: 
"This is not a case of an individual grievance that has been abandoned. Hère the 
union has settled during negotiations for a collective agreement for the discharge 
grievances of a large number of employées on terms providing for the reinstatement 
of them ail. In such circumstances a union is not required to consider in détail the 
merits of every grievance before it. What is required is that the union put its mind to 
the situation as a whole and engage in a process of decision-making which cannot be 
considered unreasonable or capricious."27 
Non-Représentation of an "Insignificant Minority": The B.C. Board 
has also expressed sentiments to the effect that a union must represent even 
the smallest group of workers within the unit. When the Public Service 
Commission and the British Columbia Government Employée Union began 
their initial negotiations, they agreed to not worry about some small em-
ployée groups "whose spécial work situation and schedules would seem to 
hâve required a spécial set of contract terms"28. 
The Board indicated that this was a reasonable and practical step in in-
itial negotiations for a group of 40,000 employées but that a continuing fail-
ure to provide for thèse employées would be unacceptable. 
THE PROCESS OF NEGOCIATION 
The process of negotiations involves the union in a number of steps in-
cluding the préparation for negotiations, the actual bargaining and finally 
the solicitation of the approval of the membership. What are the union's 
responsibilities in terms of the procédures it adopts at thèse times? 
PREPARATION AND BARGAINING 
The Boards hâve not been faced with many significant problems relat-
ing to the events before and during negotiations. The major reasons for this 
are undoubtedly the necessity of secrecy prior to negotiations in order to 
enhance a union's bargaining position and the obvious political requirement 
26 C L A R K , Julia P . , " T h e Duty of Fair Représentat ion: A Theoretical S t ruc tu re" , 51 
Texas L. Rev. 1 (1973), p . 1174, par . 119. 
27 Vincent, [1979] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 139 (Ont.) at p. 145. 
28 Robert Enoch, B.C.L.R.B. Décision No. 24/76, at p. 12. 
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of at least superficially canvassing the membership's initial demands where 
there is any significant potential for devisiveness. Further, there is normally 
very little information available to the individual employée concerning the 
negotiations themselves on which to build a case of unfair représentation. 
In determining whether there has been a breach of the duty of fair 
représentation in those cases that do exist, the Boards hâve again reiterated 
that the test is not the adequacy of the formai processes adopted in order to 
arrive at an accommodation but rather whether the union officers hâve "ex-
ercised complète good faith and honesty of purpose"29. 
One of the issues that has arisen, however, concerning behavior during 
actual bargaining is the speed at which the contract is negotiated. The B.C. 
Board has held that a hurried signing of an agreement in a raid situation is 
permissible if there is "ample opportunity for the membership to consider 
and vote upon the terms of the collective agreement"30. The Ontario Board 
has also indicated that there could be some circumstances (unspecified) in 
which it would look unfavorably upon a situation where there was undue 
haste31. 
THE APPROVAL OF THE MEMBERSHIP 
However, once the agreement has been signed, the potential for rank 
and file discontent is substantial. The employées are then aware of the 
trade-offs which hâve been made and the leadership is in a position of hav-
ing to win over the membership (or overwhelm dissident members) in order 
to secure their political positions with both the membership and man-
agement. 
Full Disclosure: Once an agreement has been negotiated, there is a very 
clear obligation upon the union officiais to inform the membership of its 
contents. However, as long as the union gives the membership ample oppor-
tunity to ascertain the contents of the collective agreement and to discuss its 
feasibility, there is no breach of duty32. To the extent that the union has 
adopted procédures to disseminate information (e.g., holding meetings, 
etc.) it must do so in a manner that does not involve bad faith, discrimina-
tion or arbitrariness. 
There will be a breach of the duty in the case where a union officiai in-
dicates to the employées that there has been a "misunderstanding" about a 
29 Diamond Z. Association, op. cit., at footnote (17) at p . 423; Esco, op. cit., at foot-
note (13). 
30 Canex Placer, B . C . L . R . B . Décision N o . 91/74 , [1974] 1 Can . L .R.B.R. 443. 
31 Magoldet al., 1976] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 392 (Ont.). 
32 Ibid; also see Harvey Adams, [1976] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 192 (B.C.). 
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term of a contract and that their ratification of the proposai was subject to 
the "proper" interprétation and then formally signs a contract without the 
"proper" interprétation included33. Furthermore, there is a violation by the 
union when it is unresponsive, rude and abrupt in dealing with inquiries 
from the membership concerning certain provisions in the collective 
agreement34. 
Ratification of the Contract: As the ratification of the contract pro-
vides the opportunity for the membership to exercise their démocratie 
rights, the union must be very certain to act in a fair manner during this pro-
cess. Proper notice must be given to the membership and must be done in a 
way consistent with past practice35. On theory, the "packing of meeting" is 
a questionable practice36 but it is suggested that unless restrictions were 
placed upon the attendance of members of the opposite faction, the Boards 
would view it merely as political manoevering rather than as unfair repré-
sentation. 
Very recently, the B.C. Board was faced with an application from non-
union members of the bargaining unit for a déclaration that they would 
hâve the right to vote in the ratification of a collective agreement37. In that 
case, the Board rejected the application as: 
The exclusion of non-union members from voting about contract proposais is a 
common practice in British Columbia industrial relations. There is a simple, prac-
tical reason for that policy: that it is the Union members who bear the responsibility, 
pay the costs, and make the commitments which are entailed by thèse décisions. For 
example, it is the membership of the Union which pays the dues that support the 
Union negotiators, build up the strike funds, pay for arbitration fées, and so on."38 
Therefore, there is no légal requirement that non-members be permit-
ted a vote during ratification proceedings in B.C. or for that matter in 
Ontario39. This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that many col-
lective agreements contain the Rand Formula, which requires that non-
members in the unit must still pay dues. In those cases, it might be a sensible 
policy to give them the right to vote although it can be argued that the quid 
pro quo of their not joining the union is a loss of voting rights. In fact, in 
Ontario, the Labour Board has held that an employée in spécifie circum-
33 Diamond Z. Association, op. cit., at footnote (17). 
34 Renaud and U.S. W. and Hawker Industries, (1976) 2 Can . L .R.B.R. 28 (Ontario); 
Harvey Adams (B.C.). 
35 Mason, op. cit., at footnote (12). 
36 Fogal, [1976] 2 C a n . L . R . B . R . 464 (On ta r io ) . 
37 Esco, op. cit., at footnote (13). 
38 Ibid., at p . 17. 
39 Magold et al., op. cit., at footnote (31). 
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stances may not even hâve the right to speak at a meeting, let alone to 
vote40. Although this may seem unfair to the non-union members, the 
Boards hâve accepted this as one of the realities of a collective bargaining 
System: 
"As a matter of sensible union policy, it must ensure that its efforts are reason-
ably acceptable to ail the constituencies whom it must represent. However, the best 
way for the inside workers to maintain such représentation is to join the union, to 
participate in its activities, to be represented again on the executive, and thus be able 
to achieve substantial influence on the policies of their bargaining agent."41 
A Board's réticence to interfère will, however, give way to action in 
situations where the union has flagrantly abused its authority. 
"It is one thing for a union to follow a consistent policy based on a principle 
which everyone can understand, although not necessarily agrée with. But if a union 
makes thèse exclusionary judgments on an ad hoc basis, in an attempt to respond 
tactically to the course of events, there is always a latent potential that a décision will 
be motivated by hostility and ill will generated in the heat of the moment."42 
Similarly, in Ontario, where the Board has also held the restriction of 
the vote to members is not a per se violation of the union's duty of fair 
représentation, the procédure that is used must not be arbitrary, discrimi-
natory or in bad faith43. The type of situation which could give rise to an un-
fair représentation charge would be a case where the union (which had 60% 
of the bargaining unit as members) had traditionally allowed ail members of 
the unit to vote but disqualified the non-union members from voting in a 
year where they had negotiated a union or closed shop provision in the col-
lective agreement. 
In the B. C. Distillery case, the union in defending its position on super-
seniority clauses, put forward the argument that the contract had been rati-
fied by a majority of the members. The Board responded: 
"If it is unfair représentation for the Union to take that step itself, as the légal 
bargaining agent, the légal picture does not improve when it is done by a majority 
vote. As well, as a practical matter, the vast majority of the employées are not af-
fected by such a provision, and many may hâve wanted the overall contract settle-
ment in any event, irrespective of their views about this individual item."44 
Therefore the présence of a majority is not in and of itself a complète 
défense to a charge of breach of duty of fair représentation. This is particu-
larly true when one realizes that the situations where a breach arises normal-
40 Britnell and LU.E.W. andR.C.A. Limited, [1974] 1 Can . L .R.B.R. 319. 
41 Town and Smithers and CUPE, B.C.L.R.B. Décision No. 80/74, at p. 11. 
42 Esco, op. cit., at footnote (13) at p . 24. 
43 Fogal, op. cit., at footnote (36). 
44 B.C. Distillery, op. cit., at footnote (14) at p . 16. 
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ly involve a minority (if not a truly small minority) who feel they hâve been 
oppressed. It is probably safe to say, however, that the Board will still con-
sider the majority position as important évidence in its assessment of the 
union's behavior. 
In conclusion then, there is scope for the Board's involvement in the 
process of negotiation of a collective agreement although they hâve often 
chosen not to use it. Now let us turn to administration of the collective 
agreement. 
The administration of the agreement 
BASIC PRINCIPLES 
The greatest percentage of complaints concerning unfair représentation 
are based on the behavior of the union during the administration of a col-
lective agreement. Contract administration has been described as "not sim-
ply the enforcement of individual contract claims " ; it is also an extension of 
the collective bargaining process. As such, it involves significant group in-
terests which the union may represent even against the wishes of particular 
employées45. But if the process of Industrial Relations is to be effective, the 
trade union must be secure in its own position as well as in the perception of 
its position by the other side during the administration of the contract. 
This authority must however not be abused. The Ontario Board in the 
Gain and Smith case46 found that the union had exceeded its rights when it 
both refused membership to the complainants who had been transferred in-
to the unit and then did nothing to deal with those members who refused to 
work with them. The basis for this refusai was the fact that the newcomers 
allegedly crossed a picket line of the local when they were working in an-
other division of the company. The union also expressed the concern that 
there was an érosion of jobs occurring at the plant. The Board noted: 
"In our view the complainants had a right to expect that their employment in-
terests would be protected by the respondent and would only be modified to the ex-
tent necessary to achieve a legitimate collective goal and then only in a manner which 
was not arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. The évidence is that the respondent 
took a number of steps including resort to an unlawful strike to accomplish the 
démise of the complainants' employment relationship and this, surely, can only be 
characterized as the antithesis of protecting the complainants' employment 
interests."47 
45 Rayonier, op. cit., at footnote (4) at p . 203 (B.C.) . See also Vincent, [1979] 2 Can . 
L .R.B.R. (Ont . ) ; George Lochner, [1980] 1 Can . L .R .B.R. 149 (Can.) ; John J. Huggins, 
1980 1 Can . L .R .B.R. 364 (Can.) . 
46 [1979] 3 Can . L .R .B.R. 205. 
47 Ibid., at p . 214. 
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However, in terms of activities during the administration of a contract, 
it is the method of handling grievances that is most often the source of dif-
ficulty. The Boards' basic proposition hère is that non-interference is the 
order of the day. The B.C. Board supports this with two practical considér-
ations. The first deals with the integrity of the union and is explained in the 
Rayonier case and reiterated with emphasis added in the Cowichan District 
Hospital case. 
''First, while arbitration is the ultimate mode of settlement of grievances, it is 
expensive, takes time, and consumes the energy and attention of the parties. For that 
reason, it is preceded by a grievance procédure... But the institution can function 
successfully only if the union has the power to settle or drop those cases which it 
believes hâve little merit, even if the individual claimant disagrees. This permits the 
union to ration its own limited resources by arbitrating only those cases which hâve a 
reasonable prospect of success... It is important as a maker of industrial relations 
policy that a union must be able to assume the responsibility of saying to an em-
ployée that his grievance has no merit and will be dropped."48 
The second reason is concerned with the issues of the availability of in-
formation and political expediency. 
"By necessity, a collective agreement speaks obliquely to many new and unfore-
seen problems arising during the course of its administration... it is normally more 
sensible for the parties to settle that type of current problem by face-to-face discus-
sions in the grievance procédure, with the participation of those individuals who are 
familiar with the objectives of the agreement and the needs of the opération and are 
thus best able to improvise a satisfactory solution... The process is polïtical. It in-
volves a mélange of power, numerical strength, mutual aid, reason, préjudice, and 
émotion. Limits must be placed on the authority of the group, but within the zone of 
fairness and rationality this method of self-government probably works better than 
the edicts of any outside tribunal." (Cox, Law and the National Labour Policy, 
1960, pp. 83-84)49. 
The Ontario Board has also adopted thèse basic principles50. 
Therefore, the Boards hâve indicated that they realize that this approach 
impinges on the rights of the individual members but that this is the cost of 
group représentation. Therefore from the above it is clear that the individ-
ual member does not enjoy an absolute right to hâve his grievance taken to 
arbitration51. 
48 B.C.L.R.B. Décision No. 56/76, at p. 11. 
49 Rayonier, op. cit., at footnote (4), pp . 203-204; see also B.C. Distillery, op. cit., at 
footnote (14) at p . 5. 
50 Prinesdomu and CUPE, [1975] 2 Can . L .R .B.R. 310 (Ont . ) . 
51 Rayonier, op. cit., at footnote (4); Bey, B.C.L.R.B. Letter Décision No. L38/79, 
April 4, 1979; Bachiu, op. cit., at footnote (24) at p. 437; Melillo and Sheet Métal Workers In-
ternational Association Local 540 and Barber Coleman of Canada Ltd., [1977] 1 Can. 
L.R.B.R. 182 (Ont.); S. Mohammed and Local 439 U.A.W. and Massey Ferguson, [1977] 2 
Can. L.R.B.R. 8 (Ontario). 
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It should also be noted that before an employée can complain to the 
Board, he generally must exhaust the procédures under the trade union's 
by-laws unless to do so would obviously be a total waste of effort. It is only 
when the union has made a final décision not to proceed (e.g., the Executive 
Committee) that the complainant should seek the Board's help52. The B.C. 
Board noted in the Western Carrier case that unions hâve adopted extensive 
internai procédures to safeguard against findings of unfair représentation. 
It would only be judicious to allow them to use thèse mechanisms before in-
tervening in what are essentially internai matters. This is not to say that the 
Board is abdicating its responsibility in this area. It is merely awaiting the 
appropriate time to act. The Ontario Board has indicated that it follows the 
same procédure, not because it has to under the statute but rather as a mat-
ter of discrétion under its remédiai powers (S. 79). It will defer to the inter-
nai union procédures if: 
"It is assured that the machinery available will afford "due process" and 
"natural justice" to the persons concerned (Canadian Textile and Chemical Union, 
1971 ; OLRB 469) and that it is not an illusory process {General Impact Extrusions 
(Mfg.) Ltd. and U.A. W. Local 1408, 1972 ; OLRB 798). We would elaborate this 
latter requirement to embrace the necessity that adéquate relief be available to the 
charging parties and that the speed, economy and convenience of such a forum be 
somewhat équivalent to that associated with the Board's processes."53 
The Board may also intervene prior to the exhaustionof the internai 
procédures if there is a significant burden on the employée, for example if 
he has been discharged from his job and would lose his means of livelihood 
while having to go through the internai procédures54. 
CRITICAL FACTORS IN ESTABLISHING WHETHER A BREACH HAS OCCURRED 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MATTER TO THE GRIEVOR 
The Board may also intervene prior to the exhaustion of the internai 
hâve on the individual grievor as well as on the union. In situations where 
an adverse décision will cause severe harm to an individual or to a small 
group, the Boards will review the circumstances more carefully. 
THE VALIDITY OF THE CLAIM 
The union is on very safe ground when it is patently obvious to every-
one that a grievance will fail. Although the Board will generally not look in-
52 Western Carriers, B .C .L .R .B . Décision N o . 19/76; Johnston and B.C. Hydro, op. 
cit., at footnote (4). 
53 Ward Shellington, [1975J 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 1 at p. 20 (Ont.). 
54 Fulks, op. cit., at footnote (4). 
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to the merits of a particular case, there are isolated examples where it is 
clear that there is no case whatsoever and in many of thèse cases the em-
ployée is simply trying to cause trouble. In those cases the Board is less like-
ly to find a breach of a duty55. 
However, in situations where there is some question as to the merits of 
a grievance, the Boards will investigate, but only on the basis of attempting 
to détermine whether the union has acted reasonably. The Board will not 
détermine the merits of the case56; the quality or prima facie merits of the 
grievance are merely évidence in the complaint as the "union's perception 
of those merits and the reasonableness of that perception are very often key 
indicators of the quality of the union's représentation"57. 
Furthermore, the union is free to override meritorious grievances if in 
their best judgment it is to the benefit of the bargaining unit as a whole: 
"(The union) was also entitled to consider that to pursue the matter through to 
arbitration to exact further concessions from the employer might well jeopardize the 
settlement and resuit in an interprétation of the agreement which would be deteri-
mental to the overall interests of the union and its membership. There appeared to be 
considérable backing for the employer's original position and if an arbitration were 
to rule against the grievors, the ruling might open the door to ail kinds of chaotic 
developments at other bargaining units throughout the local and elsewhere."58 
Similarly, the union is perfectly entitled to refuse to pursue a grievance 
when it holds the honest opinion that in doing so, they are "advancing the 
more pressing needs of other employées"59, for example, in a case where a 
union feels that the pursuit of a grievance may lead to an interprétation 
which would adversely affect previous favorable rulings60. Also the union is 
permitted to refuse to proceed if in doing so they would be taking a losing 
case which would impair their integrity as bargaining agent for the mem-
bers61. In the situation where a union fells that a grievance is frivolous, it is 
acceptable for them to require the grievor to pay the costs of arbitration 
rather than dissipate union funds62. 
55 KarlKrafcek, [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 397 (Ont.). 
56 See for example, S. Mohammed, op. cit., at footnote (51). 
57 Ibid., at p. 14; see also Ronald Lewis, [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 384 (Ont.); Ford 
Company, op. cit., at footnote (19). 
58 Scott and IWA, B.C.L.R.B. Décision No. 15/77, [1977] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 497 at p. 
502. 
59 Rayonier, op. cit., at footnote (4). 
60 Kenneth Hughes, [1974] 1 Can. L .R .B .R . 326 (Ont . ) . 
61 Johnson and Teamsters, B.C.L.R.B. Letter Décision No. L84/79, July 23, 1979. 
62 Kenneth Hughes, op. cit., at footnote (60). 
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THE THOROUGHNESS OF THE INVESTIGATION BY THE UNION 
In cases where the union has carried out no investigation whatsoever, 
the Board will likely find that the union was operating in an arbitrary man-
ner. Therefore, if a union makes a décision to drop a grievance without in-
forming the grievors of the particulars of the charge or without giving the 
individuals involved a chance to respond to the évidence, there is a clear 
violation of responsibility63. 
The B.C. Board has also implied that when an investigation has been 
carried out, some neutral officiais (i.e. other than those individuals imme-
diately involved in the events) should review the circumstances before a 
décision to drop the grievance is finalized64. In one case the Ontario Board 
speculated as follows: 
"But when the importance of the grievance is taken into account and the expéri-
ence and identity of the decision-maker ascertained the Board may décide that a 
course of conduct is so implausible, so summary or so reckless to be unworthy of 
protection. Such circumstances cannot and should not be distinguished from a blind 
refusai to consider the complaint."65 
Where the union officiais are honestly mistaken about what they are 
supposed to do and the grievor was aware of the problem and could hâve 
rectified it, there is no breach of the duty of fair représentation66. For exam-
ple, in one case, the expiry of a time limitation through the total neglect (but 
not intentional) of the union officiais was held not to be a violation of this 
provision67. However, total failure to even consider the complaint which 
results in the passing of a deadline will likely constitute a violation68. 
Under normal circumstances, the union is protected as long as it does a 
thorough and reasonable job. Such was the situation in the Vincent case 
where the union had: 
(1) anticipated and attempted to prevent the complainant's discharge even 
before it occurred — by informing him of the work stoppage and advising him to 
stay away; (2) made immédiate efforts upon learning of his discharge to secure his 
reinstatement by writing the arbitrator and requesting a reopening of proceedings; 
(3) investigated, to the extent permitted by the employer, the circumstances sur-
rounding his dismissal — by interviewing the complainant, making inquiries of 
others, and suggesting that he obtain from Comeau corroboration of his story; (4) 
sought confirmation of its opinion of the merits of the complainant's grievance 
before deciding to negotiate on his behalf."69 
63 Murphy, [1977] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 422 (Ont.) . 
64 Rayonier, op. cit., at footnote (4). 
65 Phnesdomu, op. cit., at footnote (50). 
66 Karl Krafczek, op. cit., at footnote (55). 
67 Diamond Z. Association, op. cit., at footnote (17). 
68 Compton, [1972] O . L . R . B . 916. 
69 Op. cit., at footnote (27) at p . 148. 
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As long as the union is able to demonstrate it was conscientious, they 
hâve fulfilled their duty. They must be honest, not necessarily right70; they 
are not expected to hâve the "skill, ability, training and judgment of a 
lawyer"71. 
PARTICIPATION BY THE GRIEVOR 
Must a union permit the grievor to actively participate at ail times? An 
example of a union fulfilling its duty in this regard is the Cowichan District 
Hospital12 case. An employée, Barbara Evans, was dismissed by the em-
ployer after a number of complaints were received from a fellow-worker 
concerning her performance on the job (e.g. excessive numbers of personal 
téléphone calls, socializing, tardiness, late filing). A grievance was filed and 
after a grievance meeting at which the grievor was not présent, the dismissal 
was upheld. Evans felt that she had not been fairly represented and filed a 
complaint with the Labour Board. The Board felt that the union's décision 
to keep Evans from the meeting was a reasonable and fair one (given that 
she had been disruptive and antagonistic in previous meetings) and is in fact 
a common practice within that province. 
The Ontario Board was of the same opinion in a case where the union 
failed to contact the grievor after the brief had been prepared; it held that 
the union had nevertheless fulfilled its duty as it had many other sources of 
information and the grievor had no additional information that would hâve 
caused the committee to change its décision73. 
EVIDENCE OF FLAGRANT ABUSE OF POWER 
If there is clear évidence that the union's behavior was motivated by ill-
will or hostility or if there is objective évidence of unfairness, the Boards 
will intervene. Rather than attempt to further define thèse terms (which are 
in themselves définitions), we will describe examples in which the Boards 
hâve acted. 
In some cases, a test which borders on strict liability will be imposed. 
For example, "when an employée of 16 years is terminated by his employer 
on the basis that he does not possess the necessary skills for his position, it is 
hard to conceive of circumstances where a union would not be in breach of 
S. 7 by not making an attempt to hâve that décision reviewed by the em-
ployer..."74 
70 Bey, B . C . L . R . B . Décision No. 27 /80 . 
71 Kerber, [1979] 3 Can. L.R.B.R. 235 (Ont.) at p. 237. 
72 Op. cit., at footnote (48). 
73 Op. cit., at footnote (50). 
74 Harvey Adams, op. cit., at footnote (32). 
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The Boards may also find a violation where there is an obvious case of 
Personal hostility. Evidence of this has been held to include: 
(a) an absolute refusai to help the grievor75, 
(b) a refusai to discuss a grievance at a union meeting76, 
(c) an attempt to deceive a grievor as to the occurrence of a union 
meeting77, 
(d) failure to présent points which are valid and hâve been proposed by the 
grievor78, 
(e) failure to respond to téléphone calls by the grievor79, 
(f) rudeness during the dealings between the parties80, 
(g) refusai to give the grievor access to an internai appeal procédure81. 
The Ontario Board has intervened in a case where the union's refusai to 
pursue a grievance (concerning a promotion) was in the opinion of the 
Board motivated by the fact that relatives of the union officiai and foremen 
had been promoted instead of the grievors82. 
The intentional act of preventing a union member from addressing a 
union meeting concerning his grievance by failure to give notice of the meet-
ing is a reckless act and has been held to be both arbitrary and discrimina-
tory in Ontario. However, in the case where a member has been suspended 
from the union, he is not entitled to attend a meeting as long as he is being 
treated as any other suspended member would be in those circumstances83. 
THE PREVIOUS PRACTICE IN SIMILAR CASES 
A sudden and unannounced change in policy is of course one of the 
clearest yardsticks by which the Board can adjudge union behavior to be 
suspicious. 
AN INADEQUATE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 
One issue that came before the Ontario Board in 1979 was whether the 
nature of the grievance procédure itself could lead to a complaint under the 
75 Murphy, op. cit., at footnote (53). 
76 Ibid. 
n Ibid. 




82 Ronald G. Lewis, [1974] 1 Can . L .R .B .R . 384 (Ont . ) . 
83 Murphy, op. cit., at footnote (63). 
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duty of fair représentation. In the Kerber and Doublas Aircraft of Canada84 
case, the complainant who had been laid off filed a grievance and was told 
(correctly) by the union that due to the priority system of scheduling arbi-
trations and delays in the availability of the designated panel of arbitrators 
that the grievance could not be settled for four or five years. The Board in 
denying the complaint indicated that despite the cumbersome and unre-
sponsive nature of the negotiated grievance procédure, there was no viola-
tion of the duty of fair représentation as there was no évidence of improper 
motive or discrimination. The Board further noted: 
"In the absence of an inexpensive, expeditious, statutory, arbitration process, 
the parties must negotiate their own procédures. Like other terms and conditions of 
employment, the grievance procédure will reflect their particular needs as well as 
their relative économie strength and bargaining power, and an "improvement" in 
the grievance procédure may well involve either a strike or the compromise of other 
bargaining goals. In the présent case, the respondents hâve chosen to maintain their 
grievance procédure in approximately the same form of a number of years."85 
Once again, the basic position of non-interference by the Boards had 
been demonstrated. 
HAS THE DUTY BROADENED 
The Traditional Approach 
Bad Faith has been used to describe the type of misconduct which falls 
within the category involving situations where there is évidence of : 
(a) A prior history of dispute, ill-will or personal hostility between the 
member and the union officiais86; 
(b) Political revenge87; 
(c) Lack of fairness or impartiality88; 
(d) Lack of total honesty with the employée (e.g. withholding informa-
tion)89; 
(e) Flagrant dishonesty in dealing with the union member (e.g. lying)90; 
(f) A sinister motive on the part of the union officiais91. 
84 Kerber, op. cit., at footnote (71). 
85 Ibid., at p. 239. 
86 Scott andIWA, op. cit., at footnote (58); Esco, op. cit., at footnote (13); Rutherford 
Dairy Limited, 1972 O . L . R . B . 240; Léonard Murphy, op. cit., at footnote (63), 
87 Esco, op. cit., at footnote (13). 
88 Rutherford's Dairy Limited, op. cit., at footnote (86). 
89 Murphy, op. cit., at footnote (63). 
90 Esco, op. cit., at footnote (13). 
9i Murphy, op. cit., at footnote (63). 
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In gênerai, this prohibition against bad faith involves a "détermination 
of the state of mind of the union officers"92. When the union's officers hâve 
made an honest mistake even if it is such that the Board would label it as 
"négligence bordering on disgrâce", the Board will not categorize it as an 
unfair labour practice93. Mère inadequacy and human shortcoming must be 
distinguished from bad faith94. 
Discrimination is included to ensure that employées are treated equally 
and not on the basis of "such factors as race and sex (which are also illégal 
under the Human Rights Codes) or simple, personal favoritism"95. This 
prohibition is also directed to the intention in the minds of the union of-
ficers and is not concerned with objective tests of discrimination. 
Many définitions of what constitutes "arbitrariness" hâve been sug-
gested by the Labour Boards. A number of them simply introduce other 
terms which themselves must be defined. However, the attempts to give 
some practical meaning to the word "arbitrary" hâve resulted in it being 
described as behavior which could be categorized as perfunctory, capricious 
or cursory, such as involving any one of or a combination of the foliowing: 
(a) The lack of any investigation of the circumstances surrounding a com-
plaint96. This involves a failure of the union to turn its mind to the 
merits of a complaint and to act on the available évidence97. Where the 
union has addressed itself to the complaint and décides it should be re-
jected, the Board will not review the merits of that décision98. 
(b) The failure to advance plausible arguments during the hearing which 
would hâve been apparent after an adéquate investigation had been 
made99. 
(c) A superficial handling of a complaint100. 
(d) The failure to act in the absence of any évidence of practical considéra-
tions by which the union could support its non-action101. 
92 Labour Law Casebook G r o u p , Labour Relations Law, Industrial Relations Centre , 
Queen 's University, 1974, at p . 393. 
93 Gina Ercegavio, Q976] 1 C a n . L . R . B . R . 157 (Ont . ) ; KarlKrafczed, op. cit., at foot-
note (55). 
94 Diamond Z. Association, op. cit., at footnote (17). 
95 Esco, op. cit., at footnote (13) at p . 12. 
96 Scott and IWA, op. cit., at footnote (58). 
97 Murphy, op. cit., at footnote (63) at p. 248 (Ontario). 
98 Lewis, op. cit., at footnote (82). 
99 Scott and IWA, op. cit., at footnote (58). 
îoo Scott and IWA, ibid.; Esco, op. cit., at footnote (13); Lewis, op. cit., at footnote 
(82). 
loi Lewis, op. cit., at footnote (82); Company Limited, op. cit., at footnote (19). 
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(e) Behavior which could be described as whimsical and capricious102. 
(f) A sudden and unjustified change from established procédures103. 
It would not include "clumsy" behaviour104 or where the union ''could 
hâve" been thorough105. 
The Ontario Board has traditionally taken the position that this duty 
does not require it to "assess the quality of the représentation in an abstract 
way"106. It is sufficient that the union show that it represented ail its mem-
bers in the same way. 
Perhaps the clearest statement of the concept is contained in the 
Prinesdomu case in Ontario where in the Board acknowledged that there is 
a wide disparity in the quality of union leadership. 
"... it is necessary to distinguish arbitrariness (whatever it means) from mère er-
rors in judgment, mistakes, négligence and unbecoming laxness."107 
Récent Development* 
Although the tests of bad faith and discrimination are likely to remain 
much the same, the concept of arbitrariness is slowly changing. As we hâve 
noted, in cases where the union could hâve been more diligent and careful, 
the Boards would only intervene if the union's judgment was ill-considered, 
capricious or by any ill-will or discriminatory considération108. But this 
might now be changing. First of ail let us look at the American position: 
"... The duty of fair représentation originated as a judicial doctrine based on 
the grant of exclusive bargaining agency. There, the courts hâve opened up the Vaca 
v. Sipes notion of arbitrariness to include gross négligence (see Robesky v. Quantas 
Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F 2d 12082 (9th Cir. 1978). The Sixth Circuit Court has 
gone so far so to find that simple négligence may constitute "arbitrary" conduct 
(Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., (1975) 90 L.R.R.M. 2497). The National Labour 
Relations Board (NLRB) has acknowledged that gross négligence will constitute a 
breach of the duty but that mère négligence will not (Bostick Foundry, (1978) CCH 
NLRB 20, 184; Great Western Unifreight System, (1974) CCH NLRB 26, 295)"109. 
102 Prinesdomu, op. cit., at footnote (50). 
103 James Mason and C. U.P.E., op. cit., at footnote (12). 
104 School District No. 56, Nechako, B.C.L.R.B. Letter Décision Oct. 10, 1975. 
105 Pat G. Kenney, B.C.L.R.B. Letter Décision May 9, 1978. 
106 Donald G. Lewis, op. cit., at footnote (82) at p. 385, quoting Rutherford's Dairy 
Limited, op. cit., at footnote (86). 
107 Ibid., at p. 16; also see C.U P E Local 1000 and Hydro Employées Union, 1975 
O.L.R.B. Rep. (May) 444. 
108 Kinney and Service Employées Internation Union, B.C.L.R.B. Letter Décision No. 
46/79, May 2, 1979. 
109 As cited in Charles Morgan, B.C.L.R.B. Décision No. 89/79. 
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Therefore in the United States, gross négligence will certainly run afoul 
of the statutory duty and there has been some inclination to view even or-
dinary négligence unfavourably. 
The British Columbia Board in two cases, Charles Morgan110 and 
Raymond Beym has recently given indications that, following the American 
approach, it too will broaden the duty, at least to include gross négligence. 
"As a resuit of this expérience, the NLRB is attempting to draw the line at gross 
négligence, which it defines as négligence so gross as to constitute a reckless disregard 
of the interests of the employée. Such conduct will constitute a breach of the duty 
but "the mère fact that the union is inept, négligent, unwise, insensitive, or ineffec-
tuai, will not, standing alone, establish a breach of the duty"... After an examina-
tion of the arguments infavour of widening the duty and of the conséquences which 
would likely flow from such a widening, we are convinced that it would be antitheti-
cal to good labour relations and the orderly and constructive settlement of disputes 
to make simple négligence a basis for remedy under Section 7 (1). 
By defining "arbitrary" conduct as including gross négligence, we may arguably 
by broadening slightly the scope of the duty of fair représentation. But it is our inten-
tion to maintain a closely-guarded standard with respect to what does or does not 
constitute gross négligence as a class of arbitrary conduct for the purposes of Section 
7 (1). To broaden the duty further would be to invite the kind of conséquences fore-
seen in Rayonier and recently experienced in the U.S.A."112 
It might be suggested that gross négligence will be used in those situa-
tions where there is such wanton disregard that bad faith probably is présent 
but there is no real évidence to be able to document it as such. There are 
many practical reasons set out in the décisions for the limiting of the duty 
but one must wonder whether as a policy matter, inept, unwise, or merely 
ineffectuai behaviour should not also be looked at. The many reasons for 
preserving a union's strength really revolve around the proposition that the 
strength and security is needed so that they might be able to better protect 
the rights of the membership. That is hardly accomplished when négligent 
behaviour is excused. 
Certainly the remédies could be différent in cases where there is bad 
faith or gross négligence rather than mère error. For example, where a 
union has incorrectly refused to take a grievance through gross négligence, 
it might be liable for costs and compensation. The B.C. Board did this in 
the Harvey Adams case: 
no Charles Morgan, op. cit., at footnote (109). 
in RaymondBey, op. cit., at footnote (70). 
112 Charles Morgan, op. cit., at footnote (109) at pp. 35-36. 
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"... the Symphony should not be exposed to a back pay liability if Harvey 
Adams is successful. If the dismissal was wrongful, then Adams should be compen-
sated for any lost earnings. But the compensation should flow from the union."113 
There is little solace to the member who has lost his rights if the Board 
finds that the leadership was négligent but not grossly so. 
ARE THE LABOUR BOARDS THE PROPER FORUM 
When it cornes to policing the internai problems within a union, the 
Labour Boards are obviously uncomfortable in a rôle of watchdog of the 
union. The Boards are statutory tribunals which hâve been established to in-
still some sensé of continuity and fairness into décisions affecting the world 
of Industrial Relations. To do so primarily involves being an intermediary 
between companies on one hand and the unions on the other. This is a diffi-
cult task even in the best of times. 
It is my opinion that the scope of the Board's authority should be 
restricted to the problems related to thèse relationships. To require the 
Labour Board to involve itself in the internai matters of only one of thèse 
constituencies is congruous at best and downright suicidai at worst. 
Any involvement the Board has with the domestic problems of either of 
the parties could very easily threaten its status as a reasonable and indepen-
dent arbiter of problems between management and unions. For example, if 
a union feels the Board has unfairly criticized the union's procédure in the 
handling of a grievance in one case, they are likely to perceive the Board as 
having a négative pre-disposition towards them in any subséquent disputes 
with the company. A further argument which can be made is that in as 
much as the Board does not involve itself with the internai issues of the 
company (e.g. minority shareholder rights) then it is only logical that the in-
ternai affairs of the union should also be beyond its mandate. 
The Boards understandable reluctance to interfère should not be inter-
preted as meaning there is no need for some supervision in the area of inter-
nai policies and procédures. An aggrieved employée has recourse to the 
courts on the basis of breach of contract but there are too many practical 
problems (e.g. cost, cause of action) for this to be a viable option for the or-
dinary employée involved in a dispute with his union. 
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To some degree, the existence of Human Rights législation may be of 
aid to employée. However, there are two problems; the protection afforded 
will chiefly be only in the area of discrimination and secondly there is still 
the problem of efficacy of the complaint procédures. Although this type of 
législation serves well as an educational tool and as an informai indicator of 
expected behavior, the set-up of the branches and commissions in terms of 
number of people, procédural requirements, Boards of Inquiry, etc. does 
not make at the idéal vehicle for complaints concerning a trade union. The 
proof of that statement can be found in the fact that there simply has not 
been much use made of the législation for the purpose. 
Therefore, I would recommend that the government establish a sepa-
rate mechanism to deal with this problem and the most obvious choice is the 
appointment of an Ombudsperson under the Labour Statutes. The B.C. 
Code already has a provision creating the position (Sec. 129) but it has not 
been proclaimed into Law. It is suggested that there would be difficulties in 
finding the right individual for the job and the government has not felt any 
real pressure from anyone to proceed with the proclamation. Individual em-
ployées are not likely to put much pressure on the powers that be; the em-
ployers and their organizations are not directly involved; and the unions as 
institutions are unlikely to be overly enthusiastic about any form of super-
vision. 
In conclusion, the union has to be given sufficient authority to repre-
sent the collectivity properly and in most cases, this authority is used judi-
ciously. However, some controls are necessary for those cases where poor 
or over-zealous leadership infringes on the rights of the individual. After 
ail, the Codes are written to protect the rights of everyone, the employer, 
the union and the employée; it makes little sensé to leave an obvious part of 
the job undone. 
L'obligation d'une représentation équitable: l'exemple de la 
Colombie britannique et de l'Ontario 
Cet article traite de l'obligation formelle pour le syndicat de représenter les sala-
riés d'une façon équitable, c'est-à-dire sans mauvaise foi, sans discrimination et sans 
arbitraire, ce qui découle de son caractère de représentant exclusif de tous les salariés 
compris dans une unité de négociation. 
Tout d'abord, les conseils des relations de travail, en révisant cette obligation, 
ne se mêlent pas de questions contractuelles privées (c'est-à-dire de fonctionnement 
interne du syndicat) entre le syndicat et ses membres. Ce domaine est laissé aux cours 
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civiles et aux autres tribunaux administratifs, en particulier les commissions des 
droits de la personne. Les conseils de relations de travail ne s'occupent des rapports 
entre le syndicat et les salariés que dans la mesure où ils affectent les relations de tra-
vail du salarié avec l'employeur. En conséquence, l'obligation formelle de représen-
ter les salariés peut s'envisager sous deux aspects: les négociations et l'administration 
d'une convention collective. 
Les négociations: En ce qui a trait aux négociations, le syndicat possède une très 
grande latitude lorsqu'il s'agit de ce qui convient le mieux aux membres en général. 
Les conseils sont d'accord pour laisser au syndicat le soin de déterminer par vote ma-
joritaire des membres si ceux-ci sont satisfaits de la façon dont il les représente. Tou-
tefois, il y a des circonstances exceptionnelles où les conseils interviennent. 
a) Le contenu de la convention: On a interdit aux syndicats la liberté de négocier des 
clauses opprimantes, de faire à la convention des accrocs qui sont au détriment de 
quelques-uns des membres, de supprimer des griefs évidents d'une façon arbitrai-
re ou de refuser de représenter de manière adéquate une petite minorité de sa-
lariés. 
b) Le processus de négociation: Le devoir essentiel imposé au syndicat sur ce point, 
c'est l'obligation de s'assurer que les membres sont informés de ce qui se passe et 
qu'ils sont en mesure de prendre une décision avisée touchant l'acceptation ou le 
refus d'une offre de l'employeur. 
c) L'administration de la convention collective: Dans l'administration de la conven-
tion collective, le syndicat doit considérer sérieusement le grief de chaque salarié. 
Les conseils ont souvent noté qu'il peut y avoir des intérêts concurrents, c'est-à-
dire que l'avantage qui en résulterait pour le plaignant peut venir en conflit avec le 
point de vue du syndicat sur l'opportunité de pousser l'affaire en vue du bien de 
l'ensemble des membres. Le plaignant n'a pas un droit absolu de voir son grief 
soumis à l'arbitrage, mais le syndicat, en s'y refusant, doit agir de façon respon-
sable. 
En révisant la décision du syndicat sur ce point, les conseils tiendront compte, 
entre autres choses, de l'importance de l'affaire pour le plaignant, du bien-fondé ap-
parent de la réclamation, du caractère approfondi de l'enquête effectuée par le syndi-
cat, de la facilité que l'on a donnée au plaignant de s'impliquer dans l'affaire, de tout 
abus flagrant de la part du syndicat et de son attitude antérieure dans des cas si-
milaires. 
En résumé, l'obligation de représentation équitable s'étend à trois domaines: 
1) La mauvaise foi qui provient de la volonté malveillante, de l'hostilité, de la revan-
che politique, du manque d'impartialité et de la malhonnêteté. 
2) La discrimination fondée sur la nationalité, le sexe, la religion, etc. 
3) L'arbitraire qu'on a défini comme un comportement qui serait futile, superficiel, 
capricieux et bâclé. 
Depuis quelques années, la définition de l'arbitraire a été élargie de manière à 
comprendre ce que l'on peut désigner sous le nom de négligence grossière et qui, oc-
casionnellement, se rapproche de la simple erreur et de la nonchalance. 
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Finalement, on peut se demander si les conseils du travail sont le bon forum 
pour réviser les affaires relatives à l'obligation de représentation équitable. Les con-
seils ont suffisamment de pain sur la planche pour maintenir des relations à peu près 
convenables entre les employeurs et les syndicats. De plus, à toutes fins pratiques, le 
salarié est probablement aussi impressionné d'avoir à se présenter devant un conseil 
des relations du travail que devant une cour de justice. Pour ces raisons, un autre sys-
tème n'est-il pas à préconiser, soit l'institution d'un «protecteur» du salarié dont le 
rôle serait de traiter des affaires qui se rattachent à l'obligation pour le syndicat de 
représenter équitablement les membres d'une unité de négociation. 
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